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Developments in Section Two of the Sherman Act
Foreword
Joseph P. Bauer*
The issues raised in this Symposium are of great interest and
timeliness. During the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court explored the role of section 2 of the Sherman Act' as an essential
element in the antitrust regime.2 As was true with antitrust generally, courts expanded the reach of section 2, frequently concluding
that the complained-of conduct constituted unlawful monopolization or attempts to monopolize, and approving injunctions forbidding the continuation of exclusionary or predatory practices 3 and
orders leading to the breakup of the monopoly itself.4 However,
after the Grinnell decision 5 in 1966, and the Otter Tail case 6 almost a
decade later, the Supreme Court seemed to strike section 2 from its
agenda. Finally, in the Aspen Skiing case 7 in 1985 and the Matsushita
decision 8 this year, the Court has resumed grappling with some of
the thorny issues raised by section 2.
The different outcome of these two recent decisions indicates
the uncertain direction of section 2 enforcement. In Aspen Skiing,
the Court unanimously upheld the lower court's finding that the
defendant's exclusionary behavior was a sufficient predicate for a
finding of unlawful monopolization. Yet, the next Term, in a 5-4
decision, the Court in Matsushita ordered the dismissal of a complaint asserting that the defendants' allegedly predatorily low prices
were evidentiary of a conspiracy to monopolize. The difference in
these results, the different standards of review applied by the
Court, and the differing reliance on economic theory all indicate a
* A.B. 1965 University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1969 Harvard University; Professor of
Law and Associate Dean, Notre Dame Law School.

1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
2 See, e.g., International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959); United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam); LorainJournal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781 (1946).
3 See, e.g., Lorainjournal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
4 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
5 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
6 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
7 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985).
8 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
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need to analyze the past, to criticize at least some of the present,
and to hazard some predictions and suggestions as to the future.
The eight articles in this Symposium advance this cause.
As a former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and presently a partner in a large Washington, D.C.
law firm, Donald I. Baker has a special perspective on the topic of
his article: government enforcement of section 2.9 Mr. Baker begins with a crucial observation-that the government is significantly
different from a private plaintiff in its enforcement role. It seeks
neither monetary damages nor attorneys fees, and is not concerned
with its own competitive situation. Rather, it is seeking to establish
particular legal principles which will apply to the market at large, or
to create structural conditions in a particular industry. In addition,
it must take account of political interests, fiscal considerations, and
bureaucratic factors notably different from those affecting a private
plaintiff.
As noted by Mr. Baker, the history of the government's section
2 enforcement has been uneven: there are cases that should not
have been brought, cases were lost which should have been won,
cases were won which with hindsight would better have been lost,
and cases were won on the merits but satisfactory relief was not
obtained. The result is that the case law today is often unclear.
Large companies cannot be sure either whether they will be sued by
the government or whether the courts will uphold the government's challenge. Mr. Baker observes that this is the product not
only of the special character of the government as litigator, but also
of evolving attitudes and philosophies towards antitrust and of
changes in the judiciary and presidency.
In reviewing many of the important section 2 cases over the
past four decades, Mr. Baker focuses on the two substantially different kinds of actions brought: those in which structure is attacked,
where the government usually seeks divestiture as the principal
form of relief; and those involving challenges to particular conduct,
where injunctive relief is more appropriate. A number of conclusions flow from this difference. First, the latter cases are far more
likely than the former to provide broad rules which can serve as
precedents for subsequent litigation. Second, while challenges to
conduct can deter other monopolists, attacks on structure will have
little such effect; the monopolist can only wait, hoping that it will
not also be sued. Third, in most cases injunctive relief can be more
precise, making it more likely to enhance long-run competition and
meet with political approval.
The inconsistency of past government litigation makes it diffi9

Baker, Government Enforcement of Section Two, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 898 (1986).
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cult to predict the future course of section 2 enforcement. Mr.
Baker identifies some of the key factors-politics, fiscal imperatives,
evolving antitrust philsophies-which point alternately to increased
or diminished enforcement activity. Whatever direction it takes, a
review of this past activity should make the decisionmaking process
of government officials more rational.
The existence of predatory conduct has become an increasingly important issue in section 2 litigation. In his article, Professor
Peter C. Carstensen' ° contends that recent case law has proceeded
backwards-first determining whether the defendant's conduct
(principally its pricing policy) was predatory, and then using the answer to solve the legality/illegality riddle. He instead argues that
"predation" is nothing more than a label to be attached after examining numerous factors, of which the firm's pricing practice is
merely one.
Professor Carstensen identifies a number of other misapplications of the "predation doctrine." Courts treat predation as a unitary concept, when instead its elements are probably significantly
different when the alleged offense is the long-term retention of a
monopoly, the conduct leading up to the monopoly, an attempt to
monopolize, or merely "unfair competition" by a nonmonopolist.
Courts have also misapplied economic learning by failing to recognize that monopoly and monopoly pricing do not take place in the
static model employed by many economists. Courts have been
transfixed by the Areeda-Turner test,'1 focusing on average variable cost when other costs-long run, and often total rather than
variable-may be far more meaningful. Courts have also misused
cost information, failing to recognize that accountants treat costs
differently than economists or lawyers. Courts have ignored the
fact that retaining significant market shares by techniques other
than deep price cuts may be more probative of monopoly power
than predation, and that in some cases, predatory pricing may turn
out, ironically, to evidence a lack of market power. Finally, courts
have been either unwilling or unable to probe defendants' motives
for their pricing behavior. Professor Carstensen argues that such an
analysis would be far more useful than merely comparing cost and
price data to determine whether the defendant's pricing is exclusionary or "predatory."
Professor Carstensen also suggests that far more attention
10 Carstensen, Predatory Pricing in the Courts: Reflection on Two Decisions, 61 NoTRE DAME
L. REv. 928 (1986).
11 This test was first developed by Professors Donald Turner and Philip Areeda in Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697
(1975). Although it has been modified, criticized, and even reviled over the past decade, its

approach has been seminal for recent judicial and scholarly analysis of predatory pricing.
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should be given to another factor that is often untouched at the
early, violation stage-the availability and utility of a remedy. First,
he distinguishes between the two broad kinds of remedy availablestructural, which will break up the monopoly power; and conduct,
which will prevent the defendant from continuing to enjoy its unlawful monopoly position and will recompense persons injured by
the misuse of monopoly power, and which may indirectly erode the
monopoly. Second, he notes that different groups of plaintiffscompetitors, customers, and the government-often seek different
types of remedies and have different equitable claims to obtaining
relief. Professor Carstensen suggests that these differences, and
others, should be relevant at the earliest stages of the inquiry. If
meaningful and appropriate relief is unattainable, or if the remedy
will merely bring the plaintiff-competitor under the umbrella of uncompetitive monopoly prices, courts should be loathe to characterize the conduct as violative of Sherman section 2.
Professor Carstensen is correct that more attention ought to be
given to possible remedies when deciding whether to initiate an action,1 2 and furthermore that the remedy should truly seek to dissipate the monopoly or stop the exclusionary conduct, with a view
towards promoting consumer interests rather than merely rewarding or shielding individual competitors. But, the absence of a
completely satisfactory remedy should not be a reason for condoning the monopoly. Apart from a so-called natural monopoly, where
efficiencies are obtained by having a single producer, and consumers would be injured by its destruction, the political, social, and
economic evils of monopoly make it inadvisable to put the remedy
cart before-or even alongside-the legality horse. Rather, after
examining the section 2 elements, courts may have to engage in
painstaking 13 and imaginative steps to eliminate the monopoly po12 The government's ultimately unsuccessful action against IBM may be the paradigm
illustration of this proposition. Initiated in 1968, the government eventually dropped the
action in 1982 while the litigation was still in the pretrial stages. The impossibility of obtaining either meaningful structural relief or injunctive relief, as well as the enormous
changes in the computer industry, the problems of proof, and the questionable likelihood
ofjudicial victory a decade or two down the road, all contributed to this decision. With the
benefit of 20-20 hindsight, it would have been better had this action never been brought.
13 The difficulty of obtaining meaningful relief is illustrated by the history of the United
Shoe Machinery litigation. The district court entered an order in 1953 requiring numerous
injunctive steps to break up United's unlawful monopoly, but refused to order dissolution
as impractical. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). The expectation was that these injunctive
steps would allow other competitors and even potential entrants to prosper in the market,
gradually eroding United's monopoly. Over a decade later, United's position was still entrenched, and the Supreme Court ordered the consideration of additional remedial steps.

391 U.S. 244 (1968). Although monopoly is not easily broken up, and steps to do so may
often prove ineffectual, the effort is nonetheless necessary and worthwhile.
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sition. These difficulties, however, do not absolve the courts of the
duty to undertake the task.
Judge Frank Easterbrook's Symposium contribution 14 employs
the Aspen Skiing decision 15 to reiterate and explore a theme that he
has asserted previously:1 6 that antitrust should condemn only truly
exclusionary conduct, that distinguishing between exclusionary and
desirable competitive conduct is often very difficult, and that courts
should adopt a strong pro-defendant bias in evaluating any antitrust challenge. Under this approach, a private plaintiff can succeed
only when it affirmatively demonstrates-under some specifically
formulated and tested hypothesis-that the challenged conduct is
likely to diminish efficiency and consumer welfare.
Judge Easterbrook recognizes several important characteristics
of Aspen Skiing's refusal to continue to do business with its smaller
rival, Aspen Highlands: the prior arrangement had benefited consumers, the discontinuance injured Highlands, and there was no
business justification for Skiing's refusal to continue the arrangement. Notwithstanding this, Judge Easterbrook complains that
characterizing Skiing's conduct as exclusionary rather than fairly
competitive was inappropriate. This is because change is always
ambiguous, even fair competition will hurt rivals, some consequences of competition will also cause consumer injury, and other
procompetitive explanations for defendant's conduct could be
offered.
Judge Easterbrook then makes three basic assertions. First because of the limitations of lawyers, judges (!), and even economists
(!!), litigation is an unsatisfactory method of determining whether
the defendant's aggressive conduct is competitive, and thus desirable, or exclusionary, and therefore properly condemned. Second,
since it is far more harmful to condemn conduct which is truly benign or desirable than to allow anticompetitive behavior to proceed
without challenge, the pro-plaintiff bias that Judge Easterbrook
perceives-but which has largely been eroded since the end of the
Warren Court by the growing ascendency of the Chicago Schoolshould be reversed. Third, efficiency must be defined and then
"courts must approach the task of finding efficiency in the same way
a social scientist would" 1 7 by first formulating a hypothesis and
then testing that hypothesis against the facts. If there is more than
one plausible hypothesis, all must be evaluated and tested. Until
this methodology is followed, there will be no rationality in antitrust litigation. If the system permits some arbitrariness to prevail,
14
15
16
17

Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972 (1986).
See note 7 supra.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1984).
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 978.
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it is unfair and unwise to make some antitrust defendants pay the
price for the resultant lack of certainty.
Yet, Judge Easterbrook's three premises are fundamentally inconsistent. If one accepts the first assertion-that there are fundamental limitations on the courtroom in determining whether the
conduct is competitive or exclusionary-then establishing a scientific methodology to resolve the unresolvable wastes everyone's
time. Given the logical result of the second premise-the defendant almost always wins-the true significance of Judge Easterbrook's analysis becomes clear: there should be no meaningful
enforcement of Sherman section 2. In light of the virtually insuperable barriers to successful maintenance of a treble damage action
that Judge Easterbrook would erect, almost no plaintiff will prevail
in or even bother filing a Sherman section 2 action.
To those persons, however, who question the benevolence of
competitors or the ability of the marketplace to protect consumers
or correct the results of occasionally ambiguous, arguably competitive, arguably predatory, conduct, maintaining the present approach-which permits the plaintiff to offer evidence that the
defendant acted in a manner inconsistent either with its own selfinterest or with the interests of consumers, and then shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to justify that conduct or suffer the
consequences-seems far more desirable. Until Sherman section 2
is repealed, a balance must be struck which continues to allow
judges and juries to characterize admittedly ambiguous conductfor Judge Easterbrook is correct that here uncertainty is inevitable-as predatory or exclusionary, and hence unlawful.
It is a truism that one can learn a great deal about domestic law
by comparing it to the experiences and rules of other legal systems.
In her article, t8 Professor Eleanor M. Fox describes the approaches
taken under Sherman section 2 and article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome,1 9 and examines the different treatment of monopolization
and abuse of market power by the United States and the Common
Market's Court of Justice and the European Community Commission. Professor Fox suggests a number of instances in which each
system would have profited by considering the analysis and approach taken by the other.
Although both antitrust systems have the common objectives
of advancing consumer interests, enhancing the flow of goods and
services, and increasing freedom of choice and freedom from undue regulation, they have significantly different historical settings,
18 Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 981 (1986).

19 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 86,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 48.
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and therefore differ both as to intermediate goals and the means to
achieve those common objectives. The United States has had a
strong economy for the past century, which has only recently become significantly multinational and increasingly subject to foreign
competition. The European experience is one of smaller industries
and markets, in which the members of the newly-formed "common
market" seek to overcome centuries-old barriers of nationalism,
tariffs, and currency differences. Thus, while the American preferences are expressed in a laissez faire system without direct government regulation, intervening only when companies act predatorily
or when firm size becomes unduly large, the Europeans opt for
more frequent intervention-including control of price-while at
the same time tolerating or encouraging certain growth to allow
firms to compete with their larger American competitors.
More recently, however, the two systems have converged in
their choice of legal standards, and indeed in some areas the American rules may have become more permissive than those under article 86. As Professor Fox notes, this is a product of at least two
phenomena-an evolution in American antitrust thinking that
recognizes economic efficiency and consumer welfare as the predominant guideposts for antitrust enforcement; and the growing
realization that the United States competes in a global market,
where size, technological ability, and operating efficiency are increasingly important. This change has been reflected in the increased reluctance to use Sherman section 2 to dissolve or restrict
even large American firms. Instead, economic anlaysis is used to
explain the activities of large firms and to demonstrate that much of
their conduct is competitively neutral or even beneficial. Professor
Fox suggests that much of this new learning might be appropriate
for the Common Market as well.
As the United States economy and American firms continue to
operate in a multinational setting, increased consideration of the
breadth of antitrust values, and of the varying methods which can
be used to achieve them, will be necessary. Professor Fox's article,
which analyzes the significant experiences of these two different,
but parallel, systems, identifies ways of drawing on the best of both.
Few persons will dispute that the law of attempt to monopolize
is confusing and inconsistent. Courts and scholars alike have wrestled for years with the elements of this offense, seeking to offer
some coherency and predictability. In his article, 20 Professor
Daniel J. Gifford reviews the development of the attempt doctrine
in the Ninth Circuit over the past two decades, criticizing many of
20 Gifford, The Role of the Ninth Circuit in the Development of the Law of Attempt to Monopolize,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021 (1986).
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the earlier decisions but praising that court's recent attempts to rationalize this area of the law. Professor Gifford's choice of the Ninth
Circuit as a microcosm of the internal inconsistencies in much of
the case law, and of judicial attempts to synthesize a coherent doctrine, is a sound one, for there is a substantial amount of precedent
in the circuit, the court is well-respected, and several of the court's
decisions are recognized as "leading cases." And, since for the past
quarter century the Supreme Court has rather firmly declined to
hear attempt cases, practitioners must look to the law in the circuits
for guidance.
The first significant attempt to monopolize case in the Ninth
Circuit was the 1964 decision in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co. 21 Taking a

highly expansionary view of the attempt offense, the court seemed
to dispense with proof of both dangerous probability of success and
the relevant market within which the attempt was occurring. As described by Professor Gifford, this led to the "double inference"
method of proving an unlawful attempt to monopolize-proof of
anticompetitive or predatory conduct meant inferring specific intent to monopolize, which in turn permitted the inference of dangerous probability of success. 22 This approach was undercut,
however, by a number of subsequent decisions. 23 Finally, in 1981,
in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co. ,24 the
Ninth Circuit expanded upon the predatory pricing theories of
Professors Areeda and Turner 25 to synthesize an attempt to monopolize methodology applicable both to pricing and non-pricing
predatory behavior.
Professor Gifford's analysis is valuable for at least two reasons.
First, it illustrates the difficulties inherent in judicial resolution of
this, or any other, area of antitrust law. Courts must decide the
cases before them, and often do not have broad perspective or vision. A body of doctrinal law, which evolves over a period of time,
must be seen in context, since a case decided ten or twenty years
ago is not necessarily "good law" today. Furthermore, the law is
made by different "lawmakers," as the composition of the court,
and surely the makeup of each panel hearing the various cases,
changes. Second, this article affords an excellent opportunity to
understand a very difficult area of the law. By examining the exper21 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
22 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 1030.
23 See, e.g., California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978);Janich Bros. v. American
Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v.
Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
24 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
25 See note I1 supra and accompanying text.
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iences of the Ninth Circuit, one can understand and predict the law
of attempt to monopolize generally. Perhaps the Supreme Court
will soon draw upon the intellectual struggles of the Ninth Court
and other courts to clarify some of the lingering questions respecting the attempt offense.
Although there were virtually no predatory pricing claims during the first eight decades of section 2 enforcement, the past decade
has seen a tremendous spate of such litigation. In his article, Professor Wesley J. Liebeler 26 concludes that predatory pricing claims
are almost never meritorious, and that litigants and society generally are injured even if most defendants eventually prevail on suits
asserted against them. He therefore proposes two reforms: first, a
series of screens through which the plaintiff would have to pass or
suffer summary dismissal; and second, a limitation on the ability of
the alleged predator's competitors-as opposed to its customersto recover antitrust damages.
Professor Liebeler traces the upsurge in predatory pricing litigation to Professors Areeda and Turner's seminal law review article
in 1975.27 Since then, there has been an outpouring of academic
literature and at least fifty-five antitrust decisions 28 in the area.
Although plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in the substantial majority of these cases, Professor Liebeler properly notes that such litigation nonetheless involves substantial societal costs-the costs of
lawyers, economists, judges, witnesses, jurors, and others-and the
more important economic cost that benign or competitive conduct
may be deterred by fear of litigation and liability. To these costs,
Professor Liebeler adds the more debatable assertion that most of
the cases in which the plaintiff prevailed were incorrectly decided.
Because of the appeal of the bright-line Areeda-Turner test,
which makes the legality of alleged predation turn on an evaluation
of price and average variable costs, courts have often focused initially and principally on this element to determine whether the defendant's predatory pricing violates section 2. Professor Liebeler,
emphasizing that predation is just one part of the test, would require clear proof of three other elements: a realistic definition of
the market which the defendant is allegedly attempting to monopolize; a showing that there is a dangerous probability that monopoly
will occur; and the existence of significant barriers to entry, so that
the defendant would be in a position to reap the benefits of the
monopoly it was attempting to achieve. Professor Liebeler further
26 Liebeler, l'hiher Predatoy Pricing? From Areeda &Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1052 (1986).

27 See note 11 supra.
28 Professor Licbeler's article contains a number ofvaluable appendices, which summarize and compare these fifty-five decisions. See 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 1077-96.
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complains about the common practice of making predation the first
inquiry in determining whether the defendant has unlawfully attempted to monopolize. Rather, he would treat it as a necessary,
but still not sufficient, element of proof in an attempt case. Professor Liebeler concludes that substitution of this four-part screen for
the varying tests used by the courts would have resulted in finding a
section 2 violation in only one of the fifty-five predatory pricing
cases.
Professor Liebeler's other proposal-limiting the availability
and amount of damages recoverable by a predator's competitors in
order to restrict enforcement usually only to the predator's customers29 -would further reduce the effectiveness of Sherman section 2.
At a minimum, challenges to predatory pricing would be delayed
until after the predation period had ended, the predator's competitors were permanently driven from the market (if reentry were possible, the case would fail under one of Professor Liebeler's four
screens), and the predator sought to reap the benefits of the newfound monopoly. Because of the obstacles of Illinois Brick, 30 the
small amounts in which many customers purchase, and the difficulties of obtaining evidence, some actions will never be brought. Restoring the market to its previously competitive posture would be
difficult (for, to repeat, the violation posits high barriers to entry).
In short, not only is the substantive violation reduced to virtually
nothing, but also any enforcement will be substantially less frequent and effective.
Professor Liebeler shares many of the same views as Judge Easterbrook, and the result of his suggestions would be similar as
well-substantial evisceration of the attempt offense as a means of
challenging unfair or predatory practices by single entities.
Although the Empire Gas case 3 ' may be a particularly extreme example, it illustrates the ease with which even outrageously anticompetitive behavior 32 would pass through the Liebeler screens.
Therefore, the basic question of whether the attempt offense of section 2 is available to challenge outrageous, anticompetitive behav29 Professor Liebeler asserts that a predator's competitors should be allowed to recover
damages only if the predator's price falls below its marginal cost, and even then the measure of damages should not exceed three times the difference between the market price of
the product and the predator's marginal cost. See id. at 1075.
30 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (indirect purchaser, the price to
whom was inflated because of illegal overcharge stemming from antitrust violation, lacks
standing under Clayton § 4).
31 United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1122 (1977) (threats by defendant that competitor must raise its price or face ruinously low prices not actionable in absence of showing that conduct would probably permit
defendant to achieve monopoly power).
32 For example, direct threats to competitors to drive them out of business unless they
comply with the defendant's demands that they raise prices.
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ior which does not necessarily guarantee monopoly returns to the
defendant remains open.
Professor Almarin Phillips 33 reviews a wide range of economic
literature on an issue which is of substantial importance not only to
section 2 of the Sherman Act, but also to the direction of merger
enforcement under section 7 of the Clayton Act:3 4 to what extent

does market structure 35 determine firm conduct and market performance? Much statistical and econometric research has been performed, but Professor Phillips points to numerous flaws both in the
methodology used and in the conflicting conclusions that have
been reached. Noting that in Alcoa3 6 Judge Learned Hand indicated some bright-line tests that could be derived from a defendant's market share,3 7 Professor Phillips instead suggests that such
an approach may be flawed because high market shares do not necessarily indicate diminished competition in the industry, and because other factors-what Hand referred to as the firm's "superior
skill, foresight, and industry"-may also account for differences in
performance levels. First, and perhaps foremost in this era of increased judicial deference to economists and particularly to the
Chicago School, he argues that these econometric studies are of
only limited value in defining public policy and so should not be
given undue importance. Second, he suggests that judges and
practitioners should recognize the complicated relationship between market structure and performance and not generalize from
one industry or study to another, and that they should fully examine the wide range of possible explanations and implications of a
given situation. This is a difficult and unsettling prescription, but it
may result in a better understanding of the competitive forces in
the case under consideration, while also accommodating the conflicting views of economists and lawyers, of the Chicago School and
traditional liberals.
The narrower theme of Professor James Ponsoldt's article 38 is
that expanded use of private treble damage actions, asserting
claims of attempts to monopolize by state-controlled or subsidized
foreign manufacturers that have penetrated American markets
33 Phillips, Market Concentration and Performance: A Survey of the Evidence, 61 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1099 (1986).
34 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
35 Market shares and four-firm or eight-firm concentration ratios are the principal determinants of market structure.
36 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
37 "[Ninety percent] is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or
sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not." Id. at 424.
38 Ponsoldt, Clarifying the Attempt to Monopolize Offense as an Alternative to ProtectionistLegislation: The ConditionalRelevance of "Dangerous Probability of Success," 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

1109 (1986).
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through exclusionary or predatory practices while their domestic
markets remain monopolized, would be a sound alternative to protectionist activities such as quotas or tariff barriers. One significant
impediment to such a strategy, however, is the restrictive reading
that attempt to monopolize has received from the courts in the past
two decades. Courts recently have required plaintiffs to show specific intent to monopolize, including proof of both the relevant
market which the defendant is attempting to dominate and the defendant's power within that market; and of dangerous probability of
success, which some courts have held to mean that the defendant's
conduct literally puts it on the "brink of success," and that either
factual or legal impossibility of monopoly will preclude successful
assertion of an attempt to monopolize claim.
Professor Ponsoldt's broader theme is that the attempt offense
should integrate the specific intent and dangerous probability requirements by drawing on criminal law as a model. He would do
this in two ways. First, while intent alone is not sufficient to establish attempt, it could be inferred from probable monopolization
and could be found when the defendant has taken a "substantial
step" towards monopolization. Second, while probability of success might be required when the conduct is ambiguous and a monopolistic intent cannot be inferred from the direct evidence, sound
policy does not require making probable success an independent
element of the attempt offense in all cases. The requirement clearly
could be dispensed with when the defendant engages in conduct
with no competitively redeeming value, or where the conduct in
fact comes very close to an actual monopoly. 39 Professor Ponsoldt
argues that this result is justified by precedent, by the original criminal nature of the Sherman Act, and by sound policy considerations.
This analysis gives strong support for his argument that the attempt
offense is a powerful and appropriate vehicle for attacking predatory or exclusionary conduct in domestic and international settings.
Conclusion
Recent case law has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on a large variety of antitrust theories-from rejection of the
"bathtub conspiracy doctrine" under section 1 in Copperweld4° to
the rejection of the per se doctrine for non-price vertical restraints
in GTE Sylvania 4 1 and the higher requirements for market power
respecting tying arrangements in Jefferson Parish.42 At the same
39 The Empire Gas case would be one clear example of such conduct. See note 31 supra.
40 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
41 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
42 Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
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time, the government's enforcement of many portions of the antitrust laws is diminishing-from relaxed standards for mergers (and
particularly non-horizontal transactions) 43 to the toleration of virtu44
ally all vertical restraints.
Although requirements for proof of certain section 2 violations
have been recently increased by the Supreme Court's decision in
Matsushita, that provision still provides a vehicle for challenging unfair, predatory, and anticompetitive conduct by single firms, and
the structural situations which diminished merger enforcement will
produce. The articles in this Symposium discuss the wisdom of such
an approach and the paths that such enforcement might take. It
will be fascinating for antitrust scholars and practitioners alike to
see how the drama is played out over the next decade or two.

43 See Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, I TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4500
(1982). See also Merger Modernization Act of 1986, H.R. No. 4247, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) (Reagan administration proposal, relaxing standards of Clayton § 7).
44 See Department ofJustice Guidelines for Vertical Restraints, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (Feb.
14, 1985). See also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1469 n.7
(1984) (noting Solicitor General's suggestion that Court reexamine rule of Dr. Miles Med.
Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), that vertical price restraints are unlawful per se).

